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BLACKSTONE AND JOSEPH STORY-THEIR INFLUENCE
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ADEERICA
JoHN C. HOGAN*
Legal historians for decades have commented upon Blackstone's
influence on the general development of the law in America, but
few have made systematic studies of his influence on specific fields
such as criminal law.
Supreme Court justice Joseph Story, for one, was greatly in-
fluenced by Blackstone's theories on criminal law. This ififluence
can be demonstrated by a comparison of Blackstone's statements on
public wrongs and Story's unsigned essay on criminal law in the
first edition of the Riwyclopedia Anwricana.1 Story's essay is es-
sentially a restatement and interpretation of Blackstone's discus-
sion of the subject in the fourth volume of the Commentaries.2
Story frequently paraphrases Blackstone, and even makes use of
direct quotations from the Commwntaries, sometimes without indi-
cating by marks or citations that he is quoting.3 The two works are
almost identical structurally except that Story adds some observa-
tions on American law in his essay. A detailed examination of the
two may be worthwhile as an indication of Blackstone's influence
generally on American criminal law.
THE GENERAL NATURE OF CRIMEs AND PUNISHMENTS
Both works begin their discussion of the general nature of
criminal law by distinguishing private wrongs from public wrongs.'
Private wrongs, says Story, affect the rights and property of par-
ticular individuals while public wrongs affect not only particular
individuals, but the community at large by endangering the peace,
*Research Editor, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.
1. 4 Encyclopedia Americana 34-40 (1830). Hereinafter cited 'Ency-
clopedia."
2. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 1-40. Hereinafter cited simply "Com-
mentaries!' All references are to pages of the original edition.
3. Compare the definition of "Accessory," 4 Commentaries 35, with
4 Encyclopedia 39; and the remarks concerning "ignorance or mistake," 4
Commentaries 27, with 4 Encyclopedia 38.
4. 4 Commentaries 1; 4 Encyclopedia 34.
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the good order, and even the existence of society 5 Blackstone ob-
serves that the nature of public wrongs in England is reflected by
the name pleas of the crown, so titled "because the king, in whom
centers the majesty of the whole community, is supposed by the law
to be the person injured by every infraction of the public rights,
belonging to that community, and is therefore in all cases the proper
prosecutor for every public offense." Both men point out the fact
that the distinction between the two classes is not simple because
wrongs to individuals also affect the community in which they live
and wrongs to society also affect the individuals of which it is
composed.
7
Both believe the right of the state to inflict punishment in cases
involving public wrongs depends on higher law Blackstone says
that criminal law "should be founded upon principles that are per-
manent, uniform, and universal, and always conformable to the
dictates of truth and justice though it sometimes (provided there
be no transgression of these external boundaries) may be modified,
narrowed, or enlarged, according to the local or occasional neces-
sities of the state which it is meant to govern." Story distinguishes
two classes of public offenses those resting upon legislative enact-
ments and those deemed from their very nature to be injuries to
the public, independent of any such enactments. As examples of
the latter he cites treason, murder, setting fire to a house in a large
city, and riots. Because all of these are offenses that endanger the
good order and safety of the state, it is proper that the state inflict
punishment for them. But the offenses belonging to this class are
not always capable of perfect enumeration, and whenever there is
doubt about whether certain conduct is a public wrong within
established principles of criminal law, the court should leave it to
the legislature to declare it such.' 0
Both works deal next with the objectives of punishment. Black-
stone sees a double objective first, redress for the people injured
and second, benefit to society, "by preventing or punishing every
breach and violation of those laws, which the sovereign power has
thought proper to establish for the government and tranquillity of
the whole.""" Story refers only to the second of these objectives.
He writes "The common law considers the great object of the
5. 4 Encyclopedia 35.
6. 4 Commentaries 2.
7 4 Encyclopedia 35, 4 Commentaries 5.
8. 4 Commentaries 2-3.
9. 4 Encyclopedia 35.
10. Ibid.
11. 4 Commentaries 7
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public punishment of crimes to be the prevention of offences, by
deterring both the offender and others from a repetition of the
same. Its object is not so much an atonement for, or expiation of, the
offences, as a precaution against their recurrence."' 2 And he adds
that the reformation of the individual who commits the crime arises,
not as the primary motive, but as an incident of this object. Story
observes that since reformation of the criminal is not always prob-
able, society must rely on capital punishment for security.
Capital punishment is a topic outside the scope of Justice Story's
best known writings. He deals with it at length m a separate article
entitled "Punishment of Death," which also appears ihi the fourth
volume of the Eitcyclopedia Amerwaiw" In that article, Story notes
that the right of capital punishment has been "doubted by some
distinguished persons; and the doubt is often the accompaniment
of a highly cultivated mind, inclined to the indulgence of a romantic
sensibility, and believing in human perfectibility. The right of society
to punish offences against its safety and good order will scarcely
be doubted by any considerate person." He adds that "the Scrip-
tures most clearly recognize and justify the infliction of capital
punishment in certain cases."1 And in the article on criminal law
Story declares that "the divine law has certainly sanctioned it.Pi
Blackstone quotes Sir Matthew Hale's statement 0 that when
offences grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous to a state or to
civil societies, severe punishment and even death is a necessary
addition to the laws;17 and Blackstone adds: "I would not be
understood to deny the right of the legislature in any country to
enforce its own laws by the death of the transgressor, though per-
sons of some abilities have doubted it."'s
Story thought capital punishment ought never be resorted to
except in cases of "atrocious guilt" and where lesser punishments
are "manifestly inadequate to produce security."' 0 The foundation
for this idea can be found in the Commentaries. Blackstone says
that "as punishments are chiefly intended for the prevention of
future crimes, it is but reasonable that among crimes of different
12. 4 Encyclopedia 35; cf. Vattel, The Law of Nations 138 (1829).
13. 4 Encyclopedia 140-145.
14. 4 Encyclopedia 140-141.
15. 4 Encyclopedia 35.
16. Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown 13 (1st American ed. 1847).
17. -4 Commentaries 9-
18. 4 Commentaries 11.
19. 4 Encyclopedia 35; Kent argues that "it ought to be confined to the
few cases of the most atrocious character, for it is only in such cases tlat
public opinion will warrant the measure, or the peace and safety of society
require it." Kent, 2 Commentaries 13 (1889).
MIA \'ElSOTA L. III" REVIEW
natures those should be most severely punished, which are the most
destructive of the public safety and happiness.1 20 And he adds that
"punishments of unreasonable severity, especially when indiscrimi-
nately inflicted, have less effect in preventing crimes, and amend-
ing the manners of a people, than such as are more merciful in
general, yet properly intermixed with due distinctions of severity "21
Blackstone refers to Beccaria's 22 idea that crimes are more ef-
fectually prevented by the certainty, than by the severity, of pun-
ishment. 23 And he cites Montesquieu as authority for the proposi-
tion that excessive severity of laws hinders their execution. " In
this connection, Story declares that "it is certain that the frequency
of capital punishment has some tendency to abate its terrors, but
it is by no means as certain that capital punishments have a tendency
to prevent the occurrence of the crime, or to secure a convictmon."-"-
And he points out that there is a natural repugnance among judges
and juries, as well as the public, to punish slight offences with such
severity, and hence they lean against prosecutions and in favor of
acquittals in such cases. Story declares that the probability of con-
viction is sometimes in proportion to the moderation of punish-
ments 2
At the time Blackstone wrote there were no less than one huiin-
dred and sixty offences which had been declared by act of parlia-
ment to be felonies for which the penalty was capital punishment.
"So dreadful a list," Blackstone says, "instead of diminishing, in-
creases the number of offenders,"2 7 because the injured party,
through compassion, sometimes forbears to prosecute, or juries
for the same reason acquit the accused or mitigate the nature of
the offence, or judges likewise recommend royal mercy In tis
20. 4 Commentaries 16.
21. 4 Commentaries 16-17
22. Marchese di Beccaria (1735-1794), an Italian ccononmist and jurist,
who anticipated in his lectures the economic theories of Adam Smith, and
the theories of Malthus on population and subsistence, a member of the
commission for reform of civil and criminal jurisprudence in Lombardv(1790). This work condemns capital punishment and torture, and advocate'
the prevention of crime by education. See, Voltaire, An Essay on Crimeq
and Punishments, by the Marquis Beccaria of Milan (1872)
23. 4 Commentaries 16-17
24. Cf. Montesquieu, L'Esprit des Lois, Bk. 6, Ch. 13 (1748)
25. 4 Encyclopedia 35, Vattel explains that "experience inforin us.
that the imagination becomes familiarized to objects that are frequently
represented to it: if therefore, horrible punishments are multiplied, the
people will become daily less affected by them, and at length contact an
ungovernable cruelty these bloody spectacles then no longer produce the
effect designed, for they cease to terrify the wicked." The Law of Nation'
140 (1829).
26. 4 Encyclopedia 35.
27 4 Commentaries 18-19.
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connection, Blackstone deplores the abuses of the criminal law
arising from the want of revision and amendment. These, he charges,
"have arisen from too scrupulous an adherence to some rules of the
ancient common law, when the reasons have ceased upon which
those rules were founded; from not repealing such of the old penal
laws as are either obsolete or absurd; and from too little care and
attention in frarmng and passing new ones."2 s Blackstone says that
if a committee were appointed even once every hundred years to
revise criminal law, the law would be freed of many of its ab-
surdities. -9
Dean Pound points out that well into the nineteenth century,
felonies in England were punished with death, but he adds that
"punishments extending to loss of some member of the body are
to be found specified in Blackstone and in Coke's Third Institute
from which knowledge of the subject was chiefly derived in the
colomes."30 Thus in colonial legislation a distinction was frequently
made between offenses in the jurisdiction of magistrates from those
in which the punishment extended to life, limb, or member and
this same distinction was sometimes carried over into the earlier
state statutes. In North Carolina for example it continued as late
as the fourth decade of the nineteenth century.3'
George B. Adams found that by 1824 indications were clear
that the changes in the criminal law which had long been urged
were about to take place.3 - He points out that many slight offences
.such as forgery and petty larceny were punishable with death, but
that in actual practice so severe penalties were not exacted. The
needed reconstruction of the code took place between 1822 and
1830, and the death penalty was left on the statute books only for
serious crimes. The procedure of criminal trials was at the same
time simplified.33 And in 1836 a change was made in criminal pro-
cedure whereby the accused was given the right of counsel and to
a more complete knowledge of the evidence against him, and in
1837, a further advance was made in limiting the number of crimes
for which the punishment was death.34
According, to Justice Story, the tendency of modem legislation
was almost uniformly in favor of relaxing the severity of the penal
code. He observed that "in the United States, there has been a
28. 4 Commentaries 4.
29. 4 Commentaries 4.
30. Pound, Organization of Courts 141 (1940).
31. Cf. N. C. Rev. Stat cl. 42, 6 (1837). Coast of Ga., Amendment of
1835, cited in Pound, id., note 3.
32. Adams, Constitutional History of England 431 (1938).
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 454.
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constant effort to diminish the number of capital offences.
Treason, murder, rape, arson or burning of a dwelling house are
generally punishable with death, and sometimes robbery, burglary
or breaking into a dwelling house in the night time with intent to
steal. The code of the United States also includes piracy, the slave-
trade, fraudulently casting away ships on the sea, robbery of the
mail, burning public ships of war, and the rescue of convicts capitally
convicted when the sentence is about to be executed."'5 But he adds
that in the United States no capital punishments are inflicted unless
by the injunctions of some positive statute. Story says, however,
that certain offences such as murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and
several other felonies are punished with death by the common law
even in the absence of any statute to direct it.3 0 The right of capital
punishment in such cases, he says, is "founded either upon the
notion of conformity to the divine law, or upon some positive law
whose existence cannot now be traced." 7
THE PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES
The second topic in Blackstone's outline of his book on "Public
Wrongs" deals with the persons capable of committing crimes."
For purposes of his discussion, however, Blackstone approaches
this topic from the point of view of the persons incapable of coin-
intting crimes, and who, therefore, are exempt from the censures
of the criminal law He divides these into seven classes (1) in-
fancy or nonage, (2) idiot or lunatic, (3) drunkenness or intoxica-
tion, (4) misfortune or chance, (5) ignorance or mistake, (6)
compulsion or necessity, and (7) the royal prerogative. justice
Story, in the second part of his article on "Criminal Law," also an-
nounces that he will discuss those persons capable of committing
crimes, but he too approaches the subject from the point of view
of persons Incapable of committing crimes." Story's list is almost
identical with Blackstone's, except that he has changed the order
of their discussion in some instances, and for the royal preroga-
tive, has substituted the right of self-preservation.
Blackstone finds the general rule is that no person shall be ex-
cused from punishment for disobedience to the laws of his country.
excepting such as are expressly defined and exempted by the laws
themselves °.4 0 He then proceeds to discuss three general cases, or
35. 4 Encyclopedia 35-36.
36. 4 Encyclopedia 36.
37 Ibid.
38. 4 Commentaries 20.
39. 4 Encyclopedia 36.
40. 4 Commentaries 20.
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classes of cases, "in which the will does not join with the act.""
These are: (1) where there is a defect of understanding; (2) where
there is understanding and will, but these are not called forth and
exerted at the time the act is committed; and (3) where the action
is constrained by some outward force and violence.
Story finds the same general rule that all persons are punishable
for disobedience to, and infractions of the law.42 The exceptions, he
says, are few and dearly defined, and are "such as presuppose a
defect of reason and understanding, or intention. A defect of under-
'standing exists in the case of injuries committed by persons in a
state of infancy, lunacy, idiocy, or intoxication. A defect of inten-
tion exists in the case of offences committed by chance, mistake and
ignorance, wholly without or against the intention of the party. In
respect to want of capacity, idiots, madmen, and other persons not
at the time in possession of reason, such as somnambulists, are
generally excused, whatever injuries they may commit."'3
Drznkenness or Intoxication
Blackstone defines drunkenness or intoxication as an artificial,
voluntarily contracted madness which deprives men of their reason
and puts them in a temporary frenzy.4" And he says it is an aggra-
vation of the offence, rather than an excuse for criminal mis-
behavior. He cites with approval Lord Coke's statement that a
drunkard has no privilege thereby, "but what hurt or ill soever he
doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it."' 5 Story follows Blackstone
and declares that the common law considers voluntary intoxication
as an aggravation of the offence, he adds that if the party at the
time of the offence be drunk by the use of strong liquors, he is to
be punished even though he may be thereby at the time reduced to
a state of insanity.'6 Story points out that this policy applies to
intoxication only when it is the direct cause of a crime, not when
it is the remote cause. For example, if an insane man commits a
crime while he is sober, the fact that is insanity Nwas caused original-
ly by drunkenness does not aggravate the offense. The strictness of
the law regarding voluntary drunkenness stems from a policy of
preventing the dangerous effects that may arise from indulgence
in strong liquors.4
41. 4 Commentaries 21.
42. 4 Encyclopedia 36.
43. Ibid.
44. 4 Commentaries 25.
45. 4 Commentaries 26.
46. 4 Encyclopedia 36.
47 Ibid.
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Actually, the early common law seems to have made no onices-
sion whatever because of intoxication, and the suggestion ot Coke
and Blackstone that the fact of intoxication be considered as a cir-
cumstance of aggravation was not adopted."" In the earliest reported
English case on this subject, Reniger v. Fogossa.49 decided in 1 551,
the court approved of the imposition of the death penalty where a
homicide had been committed by the prisoner while in extreme
intoxication. Prior to the nineteenth century therefore, drunken-
ness in any extent was not allowed as a defense in a criminal case
Professor Perkins observes that since then there have been some
modifications of this rule, and three are usually mentioned (1)
involuntary intoxication may be so extreme as to be exculpating
(2) voluntary intoxication may entitle the defendant to an ac-
quittal if the crime charged requires a specific intent and he was too
drunk to have such intent, (3) delirium tremens is treated the
same as other types of insanity although it results from overindul-
gence in liquor.50
Blackstone observes that different drinking habits have been
practiced in Greece, Rome, Norway, Italy and Spain and that the
law has sometimes made great allowances for this vice " but he adds
that "the law of England, considering how easy it is to counterfeit
this excuse, and how weak an excuse it is (though real), will not
suffer any man thus to privilege one crime by another "-- Hall
says that the argument that drunkenness can he readily feigned
may be disposed of at once, and that no satisfactory reason has been
advanced why the determination of this fact is any more difficult
than those raised by insanity, mistake and legal provocation. ie
adds "indeed, the contrary seems more probable when it is con-
sidered that the history of the defendant and the events preceding
his wrongful act are examined in greater detail in the drunkenness
cases than is usual. Moreover the burden of proving intoxication
was, and usually is, placed on the defendant."
48. Cf. Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility. 57 Harv. I.. Iev
1045, 1046 (1944).
49. Reniger v. Fogossa, 1 Pl. Coni. 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 ( K.B. 1551
50. Perkins, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure 434
(1952).
51. "It hath been observed, that the real use of strong liquors, and the
abuse of them by drinking to excess, depends much upon the temperature of
the climate in which we live. The same indulgence, which may be necessary
to make the blood move in Norway, would make an Italian mad." 4 Coin-
mentaries 26.
52. 4 Commentaries 26.
53. Hall, op. cit. supra note 48, at 1047-8.
[ Vol. 40:107
BLACKSTONE AND STORY
Crimes Committed by Infants
Blackstone says that crimes committed because of infancy or
nonage arise from a defect of the understanding, for "where there
is no choice, there can be no act of the will, which is nothing else
but a determination of one's choice to do or to abstain from a par-
ticular action; he, therefore, that has no understanding, can have
no will to guide his conduct."" He cites Hawkins's Plcas of the
Crow. 5 as authority for the statement that infants, under the age
of discretion, ought never to be punished by any criminal prosecu-
tion whatever, and observes that the age of discretion has not always
been ihe same in all nationsP0 In this connection, Story observes that
there are various ages of infancy, in the common law, for various
purposes. "The general age of majority for all purposes is, in our
law, 21 years, in the civil law, 25 years. Children under 7 years of
age are deemed without discretion, and are universally exempted
by our law from punishment. Between 7 and 14 years, they are
said to be in a dubious stage, in point of discretion. If they in fact
possess it, if they appear to have judgment, and understanding, and
a sense of crime, they are liable to punishment; otherwise not.
Generally, the rule of presumption is in favor of mercy-tliat an in-
fant under 14 is doli incapax. After 14, the general presumption
is in favor of an infant being doli capax, and therefore he generally
stands upon grounds similar to those of adults, until his actual in-
capacity is proved."5 7 Story says of the test applied to children
between seven and fourteen: "it deserves consideration, whether
this is a sufficient test of rational discernment of the nature of crime
and duty; and judges may well lean against conviction in such
cases, upon principles not merely of humanity, but of philosophical
responsibility."" Story observes that extreme old age sometimes
reduces persons to a state in which they would be held no more
liable to punishment than infants.59
In every civilized society, the law recognizes criminal incapacity
based upon extreme immaturity, and no matter what the harm
caused by a person of very tender years, his offence is dealt with
by some machinery other than that normally applied in the ad-
ministration of adult criminal justice. Thus at common law, be-
cause of the wide differences in individuals, the two ages referred
54. 4 Commentaries 21.
55. Cf. Haxvkms, 1 Pleas of the Crown 2 (1762).
56. 4 Commentaries 22.
.57. 4 Encyclopedia 36-37
58. 4 Encyclopedia 37
59. Ibid.
1956]
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to above were emphasized. Today, we have combined this technique
with modem juvenile courts and youth correction authority acts
which were unknown in Blackstone's time. Professor Perkins points
out also that the age, below which there is complete criminal in-
capacity, has been raised by statute in some jurisdictions, but that
any provision of this nature should be read in the light of the
common law 00
Crimes Committed by Lunatics and Idiots
Blackstone observes that lunacy and idiocy involve a deficiency
in will, arising from a defective or vitiated understanding, which
will excuse a party from the guilt of crimes."' Idiots and lunatics,
therefore, are not chargeable for their own criminal acts, if com-
mitted under these incapacities, not even for treason itself. But
Blackstone adds that if a lunatic has lucid intervals of under-
standing, he shall be held responsible for what he does in those
intervals as if he had no deficiency 02 Story also observes that this
exception applies to crimes committed by lunatics and idiots only
where the disability exists at the time of the offence, and that "it is
no excuse, if a person who has been insane commits an offence in
a lucid interval, or at a time when his reason is clearly restored.
Everything depends upon soundness of mind and real discretion at
the time of committing the offence." 3 Both Blackstone and Story
believe that where a person becomes insane after the commission of
a crime, but before the trial, he ought not be brought to trial until
he is restored to his reason.0 4 At whatever stage of the prosecution
the insanity occurs, it operates, by the common law, as a suspension
of all further proceedings. Thus, Story says if "it occurs before
arraignment, the party ought not to be arraigned for the offence,
if after arraignment, he ought not to be required to plead, if after
plea, he ought not be put to trial, if after trial, he ought not to have
judgment or sentence pronounced against him, if after judgment,
execution of the sentence ought to be stayed."' 0 The reason gen-
erally offered for the existence of this rule is that if the prisoner
had been of sound mind he might have alleged something that would
have entitled him to mercy or to an exemption from punishment.00
Story adds, however, that "a reason quite as satisfactory is. that
60. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 450.
61. 4 Commentaries 24.
62. 4 Commentaries 25.
63. 4 Encyclopedia 37
64. 4 Commentaries 24, 4 Encyclopedia 37
65. 4 Entyclopedia 37
66. Cf. Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown 34 (1st American ed. 1847)
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the punishment of an insane person can produce no good result,
either to reform the offender or as a public example." 7
Injuries Committed Through Misfortune or Chance
When a man commits an unlawful act through misfortune or
chance, Blackstone says that he ought to be exempt from the cen-
sures of the law because "here the will observes a total neutrality,
and does not co-operate with the deed; which therefore wants one
main ingredient of a crime ' s But there is a distinction between
an accidental mischief which follows the performance of a lawful
act and one which follows an unlawful act. In this connection,
Story observes that where "an accidental mischief happens in the
performance of a lawful act, in the doing of which the party uses
reasonable care and diligence, he is wholly free from guilt, and it is
deemed his misfortune; but if he does not use reasonable care and
diligence, he is liable to punishment according to the nature and
extent of his negligence.. . If the mischief happens in the per-
formance of an unlawful act, and a consequence ensues which was
not intended or foreseen, the party is not free from guilt. But the
degree of punishment ought to depend upon the nature of the
unlawful act itself."8 19 Thus, if A be working with a hammer, using
due care, and the head flies off and strikes B, a bystander, killing
him, this is not a criminal offence, for A was performing a lawful
act without any intention of inflicting harm."0 Story says that a
parent may moderately correct a child, and if in so doing death
happens, against his intention, it is mere misadventure. But if he
correct the child, immoderately, or uses an instrument which is
dangerous to life, or is wanting in reasonable caution, he is guilty
of manslaughter or murder, according to the circumstances and the
degree of the punishment.71 And he adds that "if a man, riding a
horse with" reasonable care, accidentally runs over a child and kills
him, he is not guilty of any offence. If he rides him furiously in a
street where there may be danger, and the like mischief happens,
he is guilty of manslaughter at least. If he rides him furiously into
a crowd, either from wantonness or thoughtlessness, and the like
accident happens, it will be murder." 72
67. 4 Encyclopedia 37.
68. 4 Commentaries 26.
69. 4 Encyclopedia 37.
70. Blackstone says: "if any accadental mischief happens to follow from
the performance of a lawful act, the party stands excused from all guilt.
4 Commentaries 26-27.
71. 4 Encyclopedia 37
72. 4 Encyclopedia 37-38.
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Both Blackstone 73 and Story 74 make a distinction between cases
where the original act is malzon per se and where it is malum pro-
hibitu'n--that is, where the original act is wrong and unlawful in
itself or where it is merely prohibited by statute. In the one case,
the party is responsible for all incidental consequences of his un-
lawful act, and in the other he is not. Thus in the case of a hunter
who accidentally kills another, Story says that if the person who
commits the act be prohibited by statute from hunting game, and
does so anyway, and an accident occurs as a result of his shooting,
he has committed an original act malum prohibitum, but lie is not
answerable in any other manner than a person duly qualified by
law to hunt.7 5 On the other hand, if A, intending to steal poultry
from B, fires at the poultry, and by accident kills C, he will be
charged with murder by reason of the felonious intent of the original
act which is inalum per se."6
Injuries Commttted Through Ignorance or Mistake
When a man, intending to do a lawful act, but by ignorance or
mistake does something unlawful, Blackstone says that there is a
defect of will sufficient to excuse that man from criminal responsi-
bility Here there is not that combination of deed and will neces-
sary for a criminal act.77 However, this must be ignorance or
mistake of fact, and not of law, for it is one of the maxims of the
law that ignorance of a law that everyone is bound to know ex-
cuses no one.' A common illustration of the operation of this
maxim, in cases involving injuries committed through ignorance or
mistake, is that of a man intending to kill a thief or housebreaker.
in this own house, who, by mistake, kills one of his own family "
Story observes that "if he acted under circumstances of reasonable
belief that the party killed was the thief or housebreaker, there is
no ground to impute criminality to him. His conduct was founded
in a mistake of fact, that is, of the person, for it is sometimes law-
ful, by the common law, to kill a housebreaker found in your house.
73. 4 Commentaries 8-9.
74. 4 Encyclopedia 37
75. 4 Encyclopedia 38.
76. 4 Encyclopedia 38. "If the object of the rule is to prevent such acci-
dents, it should make accidental killing with firearms murder, not accidental
killing in the effort to steal, while if its object is to prevent stealing, it
would do better to hang the thief in every thousand by lot." Holmes, The
Common Law 58 (1881).
77 4 Commentaries 27
78. See discussion of this maxini, note 9 to Book IV, in 2 Chitty's
Blackstone 19 (1832).
79. Cf. 4 Commentaries 27
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But a mistake, or ignorance of law will not justify an act of the
like nature. If a person supposes he has a right to kill a trespasser
or outlaw, or excommunicated person, and he does so, he is guilty
of murder."' 80
While the maxim "ignorance of theiaw is no excuse" is one of
the most familiar expressions in criminal jurisprudence, it is not
without exceptions. Professor Perkins states this maxim in these
words "Every person is presumed to knov the law."' s And he
adds that to understand either the maxim or its exceptions, it is
necessary to know what is meant, in law, by the word presumed.
He says that this maxim means that a particular case will be dis-
posed of exactly as if the defendant actually did know the law
whether such is the fact or not. "And this is exactly the sense in
which this word is used ordinarily it this phrase. This is the sense
in which it is used in all of those cases in which ignorance of the
law is no excuse. In those rare and exceptional cases in which ig-
norance of the law is recognized as an excuse in a criminal case the
presumption is rebuttable. In other words, while there are excep-
tions to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse, there are
none to the statement that everyone is presumed to know the law-
except to the extent that the presumption may be overcome by
evidence where this is-permissible. Stated differently, knowledge of
the law is presumed; in most cases this presumption is conclusive
but under exceptional circumstances it is disputable.
" 2
Crimes Committed by Compulsion, Force, or Necessity
Blackstone says that another species of defect of will is that
which arises from compulsion or inevitable necessity, which are "a
constraint upon the will, whereby a man is urged to do that which
his judgment disapproves; and which, it is to be presumed, his will
(if left to itself) would reject." 83 And he adds that those acts which
are done as the results of unavoidable force and compulsion ought
to be exempted from the censures of the law. Blackstone discusses
four topics under this heading" (1) civil subjection,8" whereby the
inferior is constrained by the superior to act contrary to what his
own reason and inclination would suggest-as when a legislator
establishes iniquity by a law, and commands the subject to do an
act contrary to religion or sound morality; (2) duress per roinas,8"
80. -4 Encyclopedia 38.
81. Perkins, op. cit. stpra note 50, at 462.
82. Id. at 462-3.
83. 4 Commentaries 27
84. 4 Commentaries 28.
85. 4 Commentaries 30.
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or threats and menaces, which induce a fear of death or other bodily
harm, and which, for that reason, take away the guilt of many
crimes and misdemeanors, at least before the human tribunal, (3)
the choice of two evils,"6 as where a man has to make a selection,
and being under a necessity of choosing one, he chooses the least
pernicious of the two, this species of necessity, says Blackstone, is
the "result of reason and reflection, which act upon and constrain
a man's will, and oblige him to do an action, which without such
obligation would be criminal ;87 and (4) extreme want of food or
clothing,"8 as where a man steals to relieve his present necessities.
Blackstone says that in England especially, where the laws make
sufficient provision for the poor, this defense is dubious, for "it is
impossible that the most needy stranger should ever be reduced
to the necessity of thieving to support nature."' 9
In his discussion of crimes committed by compulsion, force, or
necessity, Justice Story follows the same general outline adopted
by Blackstone. First, as to crimes committed under the authority
or command of a superior, Story says that there are but a few
cases in which such an excuse will be recognized 0 Second, as to
crimes committed under duress per minas, he believes that the
fear which compels a man to do an illegal act "must be just and
well grounded, such as may intimidate a firm and resolute man, and
not merely of such a nature as may operate upon the timid and
irresolute, otherwise it will constitute no excuse."9 1 As an ex-
ample, Story refers to the case of a man who commits treasonable
acts, in time of war or rebellion, at the compulsion of the enemy or
rebels. To be justified as an excuse, the compulsion must be more
than a mere threat to do injury to property, or even slight injury
to person, it must consist of a just fear either of death or of great
bodily harm, and even then, it is the duty of the person to stop
doing these acts as soon as he safely may, by escape or otherwise
or else he will be considered a volunteer.9 2 And Story observes that
this excuse is not allowed in all cases, and seems confined to crimes
positively created by society, "for no man can justify or excuse
himself for murdering an innocent person, under the pretence of
fear or necessity, though he certainly may kill another in necessary
self-defence.
93
86. 4 Commentaries 30-31.
87 4 Commentaries 30.
88. 4 Commentaries 31.
89. 4 Commentaries 32.
90. 4 Encyclopedia 38.
91. 4 Encyclopedia 38.
92. 4 Encyclopedia 38.
93. 4 Encyclopedia 38.
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Third, as to crimes committed by a person in the extreme want
of food, as where such person steals to satisfy his hunger, Story
says that whatever may be the doctrine of foreign jurists,0 ' no such
excuse is recognized or admitted in the common law.0 5 And he adds
that if the offence should be committed under circumstances of
extraordinary suffering the case would seldom be brought before
a court of justice, and if it were, the humanity of the court itself
or the governmental power of pardon would be exercised either to
annul or to mitigate the punishment.96
Story puts a fourth case, as where an offence is committed by a
person in self-defence. Thus, "where two persons at sea are ship-
wrecked, and get on a single plank, and it cannot support both,
but both must be drowned unless one is displaced: what is then to
be done? In such a case, the law of self-preservation has been sup-
posed to justify either party m a forcible dispossession of the other.
The common law seems to recognize this principle and in such a
deplorable calamity imputes no blame to the survivor."
07
The Royal Prerogative
The king is believed incapable of committing a folly, and much
less a crime. Hence, Blackstone adds a seventh case, not discussed
by Story in his article on criminal law, in which the law "supposes
an incapacity of doing wrong, from the excellence and perfection
of the person; which extends as well to the will as to the other
qualities of his mind."0 8 By his royal prerogative, the king is not
under the coercive power of the law, and the law deems so highly
of his wisdom and virtue, as not even to presume it possible for him
to do any thing inconsistent with his station and dignity; and
therefore has made no provision to remedy such a grievance.00
THE SEvERAL DEGREES OF GuILT, AS PRINCIPALS
OR ACCESSORIES
The third topic in Blackstone's work deals with the distinction
between principals and accessories to a crime.0 0 He explains that
94. The views of Grotius, Puffendorf, Britton and Hale on this subject
are summarzed:by Blackstone. See, 4 Commentaries 31-32.
95. 4 Encyclopedia 38.
96. 4 Encyclopedia 38.
97. 4 Encyclopedia 38. Holmes observed that "if a man is on a plank in
the deep sea which will float one, and a stranger lays hold of it, he will
thrust him off if he can. When the state finds itself in a similar position, it
does the same thing." The Common Law 44 (1881).
98. 4 Commentaries 32-33.
99. 4 Commentaries 33; cf. Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown 44 (Ist Amer,-
can ed. 1847).
100. 4 Commentaries 1.
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a person may be a principal in an offence in two degrees.' Story,
following Blackstone, says that persons are principals in the first
degree, if they are the actors or perpetrators of the offence. Persons
who are present, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, are principals
in the second degree.10 2 A person may be present at a crime, in
fact, if the parties are standing close-by, or are within sight and
hearing.' 03 Constructive presence may exist when the person, while
not within sight or hearing of the crime, is standing watch at a
convenient distance, prepared to assist, and near enough to do so
if necessary 104 Also a person may be the principal in construction
of law, although he is absent. For example, a man who prepares
poison with an intention that it should be taken or employs an
innocent person to administer it, may' be the principal felon, although
he is not personally present when it is taken."'
In the early common law, the word principal was applied, in
felony cases, only to the perpetrator of a crime. Any other guilty
party was described by the word accessory Thus in The Mirror of
Justices (a book of doubtful reputation, but which is sometimes
referred to by Blackstone) it is said
"Nine kinds of accessories there be those who command.
those who counsel, those who hire or are consenting thereto,
those who send, those who aid, those who are partners in the
gain, those who acquiesce and do not disturb the offenders
by word or deed, and those who knowingly receive them, and
those who go out armed.' 0°
Blackstone says that an accessory is one who is not the chief
actor in the offence, nor present at its performance, but is sonic
way concerned therein, either before or after the fact committed."T1
He discusses first the offences, at common law, which admit of no
accessories, for instance in high treason there are no accessories-
the same acts that make a man an accessory in a felony, make him a
principal in high treason, because of the heinousness of the crime."'
Story points out that in treason, all the parties concerned are
deemed principals propter odium delicti, but in offences which are
under the degree of felony, and in trespasses, all persons concerned
are principals because the law will not condescend, in petty crimes.
to ascertain the different degrees of guilt. Thus, in all other offences
101. 4 Commentaries 34.
102. 4 Encyclopedia 39.
103. Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown 615 (1st Amer. ed. 1847).
104. 4 Encyclopedia 39.
105. 4 Encyclopedia 39.
106. 7 The Mirror of Justices 31 (The Selden Society London, 1895).
107 4 Commentaries 35.
108. 4 Commentaries 35.
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except the highest and the lowest, there may be, technically speak-
hag, accessories. It follows as a maxim that in such cases the
accessory cannot be guilty of a higher offence than his principal.oD
Blackstone observes that as a general rule the ancient law held
that accessories shall suffer the same punishment as their principals.
Why then, he asks, are such elaborate distinctions made between
accessories and principals, if both are to suffer the same punish-
ment?"1° Blackstone enmerates four reasons in answer to this
question: (1) so that the accused may know how to defend him-
self when indicted; (2) because the distinction is made in the
statutes relating to the benefit of clergy; (3) because formerly a
man could not be tried as accessory until after the principal was
convicted, (4) because one may be indicted as principal after
acquittal as accessory. It is not dear, he continues, whether acquit-
tal as principal allows subsequent indictment as accessory before
the fact, but it is clear that one acquitted as principal may be in-
dicted as an accessory after the fact. It is for these reasons that the
distinction between principal and accessory is made even though
the punishment is much the same with both principals and acces-
sories before the fact.31" Story also recites several reasons for the
distinction between principals and accessories. He notes three
reasons. (1) In many instances, a man cannot be tried as accessory
until after the trial and conviction of the principal; (2) if a man is
indicted as an accessory and acquitted, he may still be indicted as
principal; (3) as a natural inference from other considerations,
the defence of the accused may and often must turn upon very
different principles where he is accused as accessory from what
might or could arise if he were accused as principal."12
Lord Eldon, one of the great Equity judges in England during
the nineteenth century, declared that "Blackstone's opinions on the
criminal law, as contained in his Comnentaries, are to be regarded
as the offspring of an eager rather than a well informed mind."nt
This view however was not shared by Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story in America. Justice Story's article on criminal law in
the Encyclopedia Amercana is evidence of the respect Blackstone
commanded with just one important figure in American juris-
prudence. When Story wrote this article in 1830, Blackstone was
109. 4 Encyclopedia 39.
110. 4 Commentaries 39.
111. 4 Commentaries 39-40.
112. 4 Encyclopedia 39.
113. Cf. 1 jurist 459, quoted in Marvin, Legal Bibliography 126 (1847).
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still enjoying a considerable reputation in America. In the "Preface"
to Chitty's edition of the Commentaries, published in New York ii
1832, it was said that the Commentaries of Blackstone continue to
be the textbook of the student and of the man of general reading,
notwithstanding the alterations in the law since the time of their
author.1 - And it was pointed out that the revisers of the New
York statutes had followed in a great degree the arrangement which
Blackstone had used in treating the different subjects.
Blackstone's influence on American law, since the time of Justice
Story, has been a waning influence, but nevertheless it still plays
no small part in our legal thinking.1 5 Blackstone is only occa-
sionally cited by the courts today, yet the influence of this great
jurist on American law is still seen-in the codes, through the
arrangement used in treating the different topics, in the casebooks,
through the use of his definitions and descriptions of the various
crimes, and in cases, where the American courts undertake to trace
the history of principles of the law
114. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries iii (Chitty ed., 1832)
115. Cf. Harlan Fiske Stone, "The Common Law In the United States,"
in The Future of the Common Law 128 (1937).
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